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Abstract 
The Great Recession of 2008-2009 was one of the most devastating financial 
crises of our history. The extent with which the recession plagued our financial 
system and affected everyday citizens created an immediate search for answers as 
to what had happened. Many experts pointed at the 1999 repeal of the Banking 
Act of 1933 (commonly referred to as Glass-Steagall) as a possible cause of 
increased risk-taking in the financial system. After the Great Depression, Glass-
Steagall was enacted to separate commercial banking from investment banking, 
the combination being seen as a cause for the worst financial crises in history.  
With the repeal of this act many argued that with increased international 
competition and government guarantees on their depositors’ money, banks shifted 
their risk to riskier securitization instruments that would allow them to increase 
their profits.  
 
With this paper I study the leverage data of U.S. commercial banks and a control 
group of selected foreign banks to attempt to see if the repeal of Glass-Steagall 
may have had an effect on bank risk-taking. By using different measures of 
leverage as outcome variables I was able to analyze the risk-taking shift after the 
repeal. The study finds little apparent effect of the repeal on bank leverage data, 
although the results do imply that there are many outside factors affecting the 
results. Although the study provides a lack of consistent results, its overall 
meaning can add to the debate on the role of regulation in our financial system. 
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I. Introduction 
In 1929 our world was struck with the most devastating financial crisis in 
history. The aptly named Great Depression dramatically impacted the lives of 
everyone but the most fortunate. The magnitude of this crisis forced people to 
look for answers to the question of how our financial world could be crippled so 
suddenly and so drastically. The most extensive congressional investigation, the 
Gray-Pecora investigation of 1932, found widespread fraud and conflicts of 
interest in the banking system, stripping it of its credibility. The findings of this 
investigation and countless hearings and interviews led in 1933 to the passing of 
the Banking Act of 1933, known more commonly today as the Glass-Steagall Act. 
This legislation, in effect created a barrier between depository institutions and 
their ability to deal with securities and the firms that dealt in securities. Although 
restrictions that were put in place through the Glass-Steagall Act were slightly 
loosened over the six decades before its repeal, commercial banks still felt the 
effect of the regulation on their competitiveness and profitability.  
 With the repeal of Glass-Steagall in 1999 and the ensuing financial crisis 
starting in 2008, many experts have discussed the role this deregulation of the 
United States financial system had in the financial environment leading up to the 
crisis. The debate has focused on the role the repeal had in the financial crisis and 
how it affected the financial environment leading up to the crisis, although no 
clear consensus has been reached amongst the experts and policymakers as to how 
big of an impact this policy change had. The motivation for this study is to 
examine the effect that the repeal of Glass-Steagall had on United States 
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commercial banks by looking at the effect it had on commercial bank leverage, a 
common method of examining the amount of risk firms are taking.  
This question is relevant today as evidenced by legislation such as the 
Volcker Rule, in which we still see a debate amongst our country’s policy makers 
and financial experts on the proper regulation for the financial market. The 
Volcker Rule, which prohibits proprietary trading by commercial banks, is an 
attempt to reinstate many Glass-Steagall regulations and recreate the barriers 
between banks and securities firms this regulation brought about. Proponents of 
the Volcker Rule argue that policies such as the repeal of Glass-Steagall led to a 
large increase in risk-taking and that there needs to be regulation in the financial 
market, while others argue that regulation needs to adapt with the changing 
financial system in order to ensure its stability.  
Many experts have voiced their opinion on the effect the repeal of Glass-
Steagall had on the global financial system. However, with the rapidly evolving 
nature of the global financial system it is difficult to find similar time 
periods/systems with which to compare that before and after the repeal of Glass-
Steagall. Notably, many experts examine the financial system shortly before 
Glass-Steagall was enacted in 1933 in order to pull some evidence from a system 
free of the Glass-Steagall regulations. In Kroszner and Rajan (1997), they argue 
that evidence from the United States banking system prior to Glass-Steagall in 
1933 showed that investors actually fared better when investing in securities 
through commercial banks. They argue, “investors rationally discounted for 
potential conflicts of interest within commercial banks, which is why such 
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investors do not appear to have fared worse” (4). However, they also mention the 
importance of the system of bank competition at the time with almost no deposit 
insurance or deposit guarantees. This led to a natural system of banking successes 
and failures, which Kroszner and Rajan claim enables for a better study on this 
topic. Barth, Nolle and Rice (2000) argue that the moral hazard brought about by 
deposit insurance and government guarantees on deposits greatly increases the 
incentives and proclivity for risk taking by depository institutions, so it is 
important to consider the differences in place prior to Glass-Steagall and after 
GLBA.  
Many experts have also discussed the various roles that leverage, universal 
banking and regulation have in the financial system, with different arguments. 
However, this paper attempts to draw from these experts and use their research to 
lend credibility to the evidence produced by the research I have conducted. Unlike 
other pieces of literature on similar topics, I attempt to use my data to tell a story 
about the effect of GLBA on U.S. commercial banks in the hopes to lead to 
further implications about the effect it may have had on the recent financial crisis.  
My approach to this study was to examine leverage and income data 
acquired from Bloomberg on a sample of 271 U.S. commercial banks and a 
sample of 41 banks from Germany, Switzerland and the U.K. I chose banks from 
these three international countries as a control group because of their common use 
of a system of universal banking in contrast the relations Glass-Steagall place on 
the U.S. banking system before the repeal in 1999. I proceeded to restrict my data 
using only those banks whose income exceeded ten million dollars in the initial 
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year of 1997. I then collapsed this data into sample means and separating it by 
whether the bank was U.S. or a foreign bank. This allowed me to do a time-series 
analysis of my data to attempt to visually examine the effect of the repeal. I also 
analyzed sample means on the leverage data I used, looking at the variables: 
financial leverage, five-year geometric growth in financial leverage and off-
balance commit and contingency. These are varying measures of leverage and I 
examined them all in the hopes of getting a fuller picture of how GLBA affected 
the leverage of U.S. commercial banks.  
The results of this study proved mixed, although the anlaysis did provide 
some useful insight into the affect on the leverage of U.S. commercial banks. The 
study shows the most significant result in the analysis on off-balance 
commitments and contingencys, where the data shows a large increase following 
the repeal of Glass-Steagall among U.S. banks in comparison to the control group. 
The analysis saw little effect on financial leverage, although 5-year geometric 
growth in financial leverage increased dramatically for U.S. banks in the years 
preceding GLBA. I claim that the increase in off-balance commitments and 
contingencies, which includes high-risk instruments like derivatives, would not be 
reported in financial leverage, thus possibly biasing the affect of GLBA. I also 
suggest that banks anticipated the repeal of Glass-Steagall, which was seen as 
obsolete, and thus had begun to increase leverage levels prior to the passage of 
GLBA, explaining the increases seen in 5-year geometric growth in financial 
leverage. Thus, even though the results of this study were mixed, my analysis still 
concludes that the repeal of Glass-Steagall did lead to an increase in the risk-
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taking of banks and an overall increase in leverage. Overall, I discuss the 
importance of policymakers to consider the shift in financial markets before 
creating important new policies that affect it.  
My study will now proceed with a brief section on the key institutional 
factors and any background surrounding my topic that will provide the reader 
with enough knowledge to interpret the model, results and conclusion drawn from 
my research. I will then go into further detail about the process I went through to 
acquire my data, and how the variables I am using should be interpreted. I will 
conclude my study with the results I have seen in the work with my data and a 
conclusion section that will discuss what the results of this paper could mean in 
the bigger picture of financial regulation. The conclusion section will also attempt 
to add to the discussion of the role of the repeal of Glass-Steagall in the Great 
Recession.  
 
II. Key Institutional Factors/Background 
This section will provide some useful insight and background into the 
history surrounding the Glass-Steagall Act and its repeal and also some of the key 
factors that this paper focuses on. I will look at studies on the effect of leverage 
on commercial banks and also examine research on the debate between the 
structures of financial systems (universal banking vs. more regulation). This will 
enable the reader to better understand the variables being studied and the results 
and conclusions that are made from the data.  
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I have briefly touched already on the history of Glass-Steagall but I will 
go more in depth into the many factors surrounding the act and the reaction to the 
act in the years leading up to the repeal. Looking at Table 3 (Appendix A) I have 
provided a brief timeline surrounding the history of Glass-Steagall. The main 
points to consider in this table are the policy responses following the passage of 
Glass-Steagall in 1933. One can see that in 1956, with the passage of the Banking 
Holding Company Act, Glass-Steagall restrictions were modified to separate 
commercial banking form the insurance industry as well as investment banking. 
Also, as talked about before there were slight loosenings of the Glass-Steagall 
regulations before GLBA, seen in 1986 with the amendment to section 20 of the 
Banking Act. This was the largest loosening of regulation before GLBA and it is 
important to consider how this loosening of regulation could have an affect on the 
results of my analysis.  
The repeal of Glass-Steagall was lobbied for since the day it passed into 
law, but the arguments grew more persistent in the 1980’s and early 1990’s. 
Those who asked for the repeal claimed that the act decreased the competitiveness 
of U.S. commercial banks with foreign banks that were given more financial 
freedom. There were also arguments that repealing Glass-Steagall would decrease 
the risk for depository institutions, as it would allow them to diversify their 
investments and the securities activities they were undertaking. As more lobbied 
for the repeal of Glass-Steagall, equally as many stood their ground with strong 
arguments on why the act should never be repealed. Many of these, including a 
plea by Senator Paul Wellstone shortly before GLBA was passed, claimed that 
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repealing Glass-Steagall would allow for the formation of financial conglomerates 
with a huge amount of risk placed on their depositors’ government guaranteed 
money. These people feared the formation of the financial corporations later 
termed “too big to fail” and the negative effects they could have on the world 
financial system.  
Although both sides of the argument have credibility, it is important to 
understand that many other external factors influenced how banks actually reacted 
to the repeal of Glass-Steagall. Acharya, Cooley, Richardson and Walter, in their 
paper “Manufacturing Tail Risk: A Perspective on the Financial Crisis of 2007-
2009” talk about the role of deregulation in shifting the risk-taking practices of 
banks. They argue that although Glass-Steagall was becoming obsolete by the 
time it was repealed, the deregulation and financial environment of the time led to 
a large increase in leverage and risk-taking by commercial banks (2009).  
It is also important to discuss the role of leverage in the financial system 
and how it is used as a measure of risk. In layman’s terms financial leverage is the 
amount of a companie’s assets financed by debt. With government guarantees 
entering the financial system this means that an increase in leverage in 
commercial banks means that not only are shareholders and investors having the 
risk of their investments increase but taxpayers are equally at risk. This is why we 
saw the Great Recession affect so many people throughout the United States 
because the government was forced to bailout the large financial institutions that 
were too big to fail. Barth, Nolle, and Rice claim that “’in addition to the volatility 
of the environment, an increase in bankers’ inclinations and incentives to take risk 
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explains why banking no longer appears to be safe” (2000; p 1-2). The shifts in 
the financial environment around the time of GLBA, including government 
guarantees, allowed commercial bnaks to drastically increase their risk once the 
regulations that had been restricting them were lifted.  
 Understanding the role that leverage plays as a measure of risk and how 
financial deregulation can affect the risk-taking of banks is important for the 
analysis provided in the rest of this paper. It is an extremely complex topic but to 
understand it on a basic level and some of the literature on it will allow for a 
better understanding of the graphs and tables in the following sections.  
It is also necessary to have an understanding of banking structure for a 
stronger analysis between the control group of universal foreign banks and the 
more tightly regulated U.S. banks. Before GLBA repealed the regulations put in 
place with Glass-Steagall, the U.S. banking structure was much more tightly 
regulated and the activities of different sectors of the financial system were for the 
most part separate. After the repeal, the series of mergers and consolidations that 
formed the large financial conglomerates that made up much of the financial 
sector brought the structure of the U.S. banking system much closer to the 
universal banking system seen in Europe. Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr. in his paper 
“The Dark Side of Universal Banking” argues that “given the massive losses 
suffered by universal banks, and the extraordinary governmental assistance they 
hve received, they are clearly the epicenter of the global financial crisis” (2009, p. 
963). With the emergence of a more universal banking structure after the repeal of 
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Glass-Steagall, the government guarantees and the formation of these large 
financial conglomerates exemplified the financial crisis when it finally hit.  
The importance of this difference in banking structure will be seen in the 
analysis and it will become clear that the emergence of this universal banking 
structure following the repeal led to the financial system growing at an 
exponential rate and possibly leading to a much greater financial crisis than would 
otherwise hav happened.  
 
III. Data Description 
The data that was used for this analysis was on a sample of 271 U.S. 
commercial bnaks and a control group consisting of 41 banks from Germany, 
Switzerland and the U.K. These international banks served as my control group 
due to the system of universal banking that they have had in place for decades. 
The universal banking system, as discussed in the previous section, is a system 
with little to no regulation and thus serves as a strong control when compared to 
the U.S. banking system which went from a highly regulated system before 
GLBA to a much less regulated system after the repeal. This data was acquired 
from the Bloomberg Data Service and allowed me to screen the banks which I 
used and also to select various financial variables to collect my data. 
I studied three different variables related to the leverage of banks provided 
through Bloomberg. These were financial leverage, defined as average total assets 
divided by average total common equity; 5-year geometric growth of financial 
leverage, a growth rate of financial leverage calculated using a geometric formula; 
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and off-balance commitments and contingencies, defined as “the notional amount 
(underlying principal amount) of derivatives such as caps and floors, futures and 
forwards, currency options, currency swaps, interest rate swaps. 
Includes the contract amount of commitments to extend credit (irrevocable 
undrawn loan facilities), letters of credit, total minimum operating lease 
payments, pledged assets, and leverage deposit contracts” (Bloomberg). These 
three different measures give a varying outlook on the risk-taking measures of 
banks around the time of GLBA.  I also analysed the two separate measures 
included in the formula of financial leverage, average total assets and average 
total common equity, in order to give a better picture of what was affecting 
financial leverage.  
 First looking at Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (Appendix A), we see a 
brief summary of the data that was worked with in this study. I separated the 
summary into U.S. banks and the control group of foreign banks. Immediately 
once can notice that there is a far larger number of observations for U.S. banks 
but this follows from the idea that the foreign banks in our control group operate 
under the universal banking system. This inherently entails a smaller number of 
large financial institutions. The U.S. banking system is also much larger and there 
are just a much larger number of U.S. banks than most other countries in the 
world.  
 Looking at some of the descriptive statistics we see that for both financial 
leverage and off-balance commitments and contingencies, the data for our control 
group tends to be much larger than that for U.S. banks. For example the sample 
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mean of financial leverage for U.S. banks is 11.55928, whereas the sample mean 
for the same variable for foreign banks is 23.73899. This also follows from the 
fact that our control group is supposed to represent the universal banking system, 
which allows for the formation of large financial institutions that generally are 
able to invest in high-risk investment instruments.  
 
IV. Results 
I started my analysis with the most basic measure of leverage used, 
financial leverage. Looking at Graph 2 (Appendix A) there is a graph of the 
sample means of the financial leverage collected on U.S. and Foreign banks 
relative to the 2000 levels. The horizontal axis represents the year for which the 
data was reported and the vertical axis represents the sample mean value for 
financial leverage calculated as a fraction relative to 2000 levels. U.S. banks are 
represented by the red dotted line whereas foreign banks are represented with the 
blue dotted line.  
Interestingly, we see very little change in financial leverage in both U.S. 
banks and our control group of foreign banks. This comes as a surprise because as 
talked about in the previous section, deregulation in a financial environment like 
the one around the time of GLBA would be expected to cause an increase in 
leverage. However, digging a little deeper into this variable we have Graphs 2(a) 
and 2(b) which represent the two aspects of the formula that calculates financial 
leverage; average total assets and average total common equity both relative to 
their respective 2000 levels. Examining both of these graphs shows a fairly steady 
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increase in both the numerator and denominator, which would explain the lack of 
an overall increase in the financial leverage variable. Interpreting these two 
variables we see that in the period following GLBA and leading up to the Great 
Recession of 2007-2009 banks were rapidly increasing their assets and the market 
was in turn increasing the value of these banks. We will discuss this further when 
we examine the next two variables as both of them provide possible explanations 
for the surprising result seen in financial leverage.  
 The analysis then moves onto the 5-year geometric growth in financial 
leverage, a growth rate of the variable just discussed calculated using a geometric 
formula. Looking at Graph 1 (Appendix A) we once again are faced with an 
extremely interesting result. We actually see this variable start to rapidly increase 
in U.S. banks a few years before GLBA. This seems to say that leverage of banks 
was increasing before the repeal of Glass-Steagall ever happened. As discussed in 
previous sections, there were slight loosenings of the Glass-Steagall restrcitions 
before GLBA and that Glass-Steagall was becoming increasingly obsolete before 
the repeal. A possible explanation of the surprising result with this variable is that 
as Glass-Steagall was increasingly loosened and the repeal of the act seemed 
imminent, banks anticipated this by increasing their leverage earlier. Also, the 
large series of bank mergers and acquisitions that formed many of the large 
financial conglomerates began a year or two before GLBA, which may have led 
to these newly formed institutions to begin increasing their leverage levels along 
with the anticipation of the seemingly inevitable repeal of Glass-Steagall. 
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Looking at Table 1 we can see that U.S. banks 5-year geometric growth in 
financial leverage increased from -6.896 in 1997 to -4.083 in 1998 and -0.693 in 
1999, the three years of data we have before the repeal. This is compared to an 
extremely little change in the growth rate of the control group form 1.197 in 1997 
to 1.380 in 1998 and 0.681. It is interesting to observe that the control group of 
universal foreign banks starts with positive 5-year financial growth, whereas U.S. 
banks start extremely negative. This could signal the affect that the Glass-Steagall 
regulations had on the leverage and risk-taking capabilities of banks before the 
repeal. As U.S. banks began to see regulations loosen they were able to start 
increasing their leverage from minimal levels to those similar to the levels seen in 
the universal banking system of the control group.  
The final variable included in the analysis was off-balance commitments 
and contingency, also measured as relative to 2000 levels. Examining Graph 3 
(Appendix A) we notice the first actual apparent affect of GLBA on U.S. 
commercial banks, especially in comparison to the control group. In the year or 
two following the repeal (2000-2002) we see the notional amount of derivatives 
for U.S. banks increase substantially more than for the foreign banks. This is an 
interesting observation, especially compared to the previous two variables which 
showed inconsistent results. This result shows that after commercial banks were 
allowed to undertake investment banking activities the volume of derivatives and 
commitments to extend credit, two high-risk instruments, increased in comparison 
to the universal banking system of the control group. Allowed this new freedom 
14 
in the financial system, U.S. commercial banks increased the risk that they were 
taking with their depositors’ money.  
Again looking at Table 1, we can notice the difference in the control group 
and the group of U.S. banks. In 1999, U.S. banks had a value of 0.777 compared 
to the control group’s value of 0.544. We then see a jump almost double that of 
the control group when in 2001 the value for U.S. banks shoots up to 2.249 
compared to an increase to only 1.117 for the control group. This significant 
result in this variable can also be used to attempt to explain some of the 
inconsistencies in the results analyzed for the previous variables. With financial 
leverage we saw little change in the variable and saw both average total assets and 
average total common equity increase at a similar rate over the time period 
leading to the Great Recession. However, the large increase in derivatives and 
other similar instruments could possibly have not been fully reported as the banks 
assets. This could mean that these banks were taking on an increasing amount of 
risk that was not reported in their assets and thus did not result in any apparent 
penalty in their stock prices. Thus, the financial leverage variable that we are 
interpreting may be biased due to this.  
The overall results from the analysis were clearly mixed and affected by a 
variety of factors influencing the financial system around this time period. While 
we saw little affect on financial leverage, we saw a significant affect on off-
balance commitments and contingencies possiblying signaling that the actual 
affect on financial leverage is not shown clearly by the data I studied. We also 
saw a surprising increasing in 5-year geometric growth in financial leverage 
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before GLBA was passed in 1999. I guessed that this may have been an 
anticipatory move by banks with the repeal of Glass-Steagall seeming inevitable.  
Observed individually it is hard to draw any hard conclusions from any 
one of these variables but observing them all together allows at least somewhat of 
a story to tell about the effect of the repeal of Glass-Steagall. Although some of 
the pieces that I put together in my analysis are just presumptions or guesses, they 
provide at least an attempt to explain the results seen in the data.  
 
V. Policy Implications 
In order to really conclude one way or another on the effect that the repeal 
of Glass-Steagall had on the leverage of U.S. commercial banks this study would 
have had to produce some more consistent results. However, it seems entirely 
plausible that if more work were to be done to uncover more of the story hidden 
in the data we would see that the repeal of Glass-Steagall did lead to an increase 
in risk-taking in commercial banks and also increased the damage done during the 
Great Recession. It is important to note that the role of regulation in the financial 
system is still not entirely made clear, although this study showed that the 
deregulation that occurred in the late 1990s did not consider the ways in which the 
financial system was shifting. Although Glass-Steagall was considered obsolete 
by many by this time that did not mean that some other regulation or policy would 
not have been beneficial to the financial system. 
It is hard to take seriously the bankers and lobbyists who lobbied for the 
repeal of Glass-Steagall. Although they presented valid and credible arguments as 
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to how the repeal could actually benefit the financial system it became 
increasingly evident that this was not the true reason that the repeal was wanted. 
Banks wanted to maintain competitiveness with their international counterparts, 
forcing them to take risky decisions, knowing that these decisions were 
guaranteed by the government and not their investors or shareholders. The 
policymakers of our country must consider the ways in which a changing 
financial system could affect the mindset of those involved in it. Acharya claims 
that “this is not to argue that the Banking Act of the 1930s should necessarily 
have remained in place, only that whatever replaced them should have been 
mindful of the market failures that led to their passage in the first place” (2009, p. 
259). This becomes even more relevant now, when policymakers are attempting 
to fix the apparently broken financial system that resulted in the worst financial 
crisis since the Great Depression.  
One has to only look at the new set of regulation being introduced into our 
financial system, highlighted by the Volcker Rule, to see how policymakers 
struggle to keep up with the shifts in the market. Whitehead argues that “the 
Volcker Rule, consequently, fails to reflect an important shift in the financial 
markets, arguing, at least initially, for a narrow definition of proprietary trading 
and a more fluid approach to implementing the Rule” (2011, p. 39). The inability 
of policymakers to implement effective regulations that keep up with the shifts of 
the financial system will result in more financial crises in the future, hopefully 
none of them as destructive as the Great Recession or the Great Depression which 
forced the passage of Glass-Steagall to begin with.  
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VI. Conclusion 
The results of this study definitely will help to further the debate about the 
role of regulation in financial crises and the role that the repeal of Glass-Steagall 
had in the Great Recession of 2007-2008. Although our results were mixed they 
still showed that the period of deregulation surrounding the repeal of Glass-
Steagall led to an increase in the risk-taking of banks in the United States, as well 
as an overall increase in the risk-taking throughout the global financial system. 
Unless policymakers take the time to really understand the ways in which the 
financial system is shifting they will not be able to effectively control the 
members of this system.  
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Appendix A: Tables and Graphs 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
U.S. Banks 
Statistic Financial 
Leverage 
5-Year Geometric 
Growth 
Off-Balance Commitments and 
Contingencies 
Sample 
Mean 11.55928 0.417422 10119.44 
Standard 
Deviation 6.097354 5.306029 164508.2 
      
Observations 2831 2183 2767 
Foreign Banks 
Statistic Financial 
Leverage 
5-Year Geometric 
Growth 
Off-Balance Commitments and 
Contingencies 
Sample 
Mean 23.73899 -0.7463769 1349592 
Standard 
Deviation 13.32391 7.477619 7916855 
      
Observations 481 412 484 
 
 
 
Table 2: Sample Means Relative to 2000 Levels 
  Financial Leverage 
5yr Geo Growth: 
Financial Leverage 
Off Balance Commit 
& Contingency 
 Obs: 
U.S.  
(2831) 
Foreign 
(481) 
U.S. 
(2183) 
Foreign 
(412) 
U.S. 
(2767) 
Foreign 
(484) 
1997 0.9316 1.0968 -6.8960 1.1970 0.1074 0.5147 
1998 0.9335 1.0569 -4.0827 1.3802 1.0282 0.5420 
1999 0.9724 1.0395 -0.6933 0.6808 0.7771 0.5449 
2000 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2001 0.9890 0.9393 2.4774 3.1654 2.2493 1.1171 
2002 0.9530 0.9495 1.5180 2.7997 2.3099 1.2302 
2003 0.9154 0.9020 -0.2693 3.1687 2.1112 1.8609 
2004 0.9120 0.8721 -2.6114 3.7423 2.4936 1.9089 
2005 0.9152 0.9396 -3.6418 1.6837 2.9641 3.8950 
2006 0.9006 0.9800 -3.6505 -0.1104 3.4900 5.8902 
2007 0.8684 1.0069 -3.8583 -0.1424 4.1326 10.7431 
2008 0.8957 1.0929 -1.1212 -2.6396 13.2849 5.0921 
2009 0.9485 1.0885 1.2198 -3.7759 10.7130 5.0750 
2010 0.9591 0.9961 0.0676 -1.3724 9.2131 6.3209 
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Table 3: Sample Means 
  Financial Leverage 
5yr Geo Growth: 
Financial Leverage 
Off Balance Commit & 
Contingency 
 Obs: 
U.S.  
(2831) 
Foreign 
(481) 
U.S. 
(2183) 
Foreign 
(412) 
U.S. 
(2767) 
Foreign 
(484) 
1997 11.2784 27.2096 -2.9281 -1.0463 925.0344 286695.83 
1998 11.3004 26.2193 -1.7336 -1.2064 8851.5093 301911.26 
1999 11.7723 25.7868 -0.2944 -0.5951 6690.3675 303535.84 
2000 12.1060 24.8079 0.4246 -0.8741 8609.0419 557024.74 
2001 11.9731 23.3024 1.0519 -2.7667 19363.889 622232.14 
2002 11.5367 23.5543 0.6445 -2.4471 19886.132 685267.95 
2003 11.0823 22.3773 -0.1143 -2.7697 18175.365 1036559.1 
2004 11.0410 21.6342 -1.1088 -3.2710 21467.41 1063314.9 
2005 11.0805 23.3099 -1.5463 -1.4717 25517.844 2169588.8 
2006 10.9022 24.3121 -1.5500 0.0965 30045.494 3280968.2 
2007 10.5126 24.9789 -1.6383 0.1245 35578.026 5984194.7 
2008 10.8439 27.1124 -0.4761 2.3072 114370.44 2836401.4 
2009 11.4831 27.0033 0.5180 3.3004 92228.82 2826885.4 
2010 11.6113 24.7113 0.0287 1.1995 79315.935 3520873.8 
Table 4: 
Brief Timeline of Financial Regulation and Deregulation in the United 
States 
Year Major Event or Policy 
1932 Gray-Pecora Investigation found corruption and fraud within 
investment firms and commercial banks before The Great 
Depression 
1933 Banking Act of 1933 with Glass-Steagall provisions dealt mainly 
with separating commercial and investment banking 
1956 The Bank Holding Company Act separated commercial banking 
from the insurance industry 
1986 Amendment to Section 20 allowing all bank holding companies 
(BHCs) to underwrite up to 10% of revenue in previously 
ineligible securities 
1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in effect repeals Glass-Steagall 
allowing commercial banks to undertake investment banking 
activities 
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Summary of Capstone Project 
 
I completed my Honors Capstone through the Economics of Distinction 
Program, which is an econometrics based research project. Econometrics is the 
study of statistical economics and is conducted by analyzing data to make further 
economic implications. I chose to complete my project on the 1999 repeal of the 
Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall) and its effect on U.S. commercial banks in 
an attempt to investigate the effect of this financial deregulation on the Great 
Recession of 2007-2009.  
The Banking Act of 1933 was enacted immediately following the Great 
Depression, the worst global financial crisis in history. After this crisis a number 
of Congressional investigations were carried out to try and pinpoint the cause of 
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the depression. These investigations culminated in the Grey-Pecora investigation 
of 1932 which found widespread fraud and conflicts of interest within the 
financial industry and placed the blame of this on commercial banks being 
connected to the securitization industry. Many believed that commercial banks 
being able to make investments with their depositors’ money led to huge conflicts 
in the financial system and ultimately brought down the industry. This ultimately 
led to the passage of the Banking Act of 1933, more commonly known as the 
Glass-Steagall Act after the two senators responsible for the bill. Glass-Steagall 
made it illegal for depository institutions to undertake any investment banking 
activites in an attempt to reduce the chances of another Great Depression.  
However, as the time since the passage of Glass-Steagall grew larger, 
more and more policymakers and people within the banking industry began to feel 
that the Glass-Steagall regulations were becoming obsolete and hampering their 
international competitiveness and profitability. Many lobbied strongly to have 
these regulations eliminated and policymakers slightly loosened them in the 1980s 
and early 1990s. Glass-Steagall did not get fully repealed until 1999 with the 
passage of The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 (more commonly 
known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act). 
Many experts had voiced strong opinions on why Glass-Steagall should or 
should not be repealed. Famously, Senator Paul Wellstone made an impassioned 
plea on the Senate floor shortly before GLBA was passed claiming that repealing 
the Glass-Steagall regulations would lead to the formation of large financial 
conglomerates that would be “too big to fail.” This is a phrase those of us who 
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have lived through the recent recession are all too familiar with and is a reason 
why the repeal of Glass-Steagall is debated so often as a possible cause or 
amplifier of the Great Recession, so aptly named after its predecessor.  
There were also many credible arguments as to why the seemingly 
obsolete Glass-Steagall should be repealed. These focused on the decreasing 
competitiveness of U.S. banks in an increasingly global arena and also argued that 
the repeal would decrease the risk of banks by allowing them to diversify their 
investments. In an ideal financial system these arguments should be true, which is 
why so many wondered if the repeal decreased the magnitude of the Great 
Recession or if animal spirits eliminated the validity of these arguments.  
I chose to analyze data on U.S. commercial banks, collected through the 
Bloomberg database, to see what, if any, effect the repeal of Glass-Steagall had on 
commercial banks and their risk-taking leading up to the Great-Recession. I used 
a control group consisting of banks from the U.K., Germany and Switzerland, all 
countries whose banking system operates under a structure of universal banking, a 
structure with extremely little regulation. I felt that this group would serve as a 
strong comparison against U.S. banks that went from a heavily regulated system 
under Glass-Steagall to a system much closer to universal banking after the 
repeal.  
I completed my analysis by looking at three different variables that all 
constituted a measurement of leverage in banks. In its most simple terms leverage 
is the amount of a firm’s assets that are financed by debt. Leverage is typically 
used as a measure of risk and this is why I decided to study these variables in 
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order to see the effect of the repeal on the risk-taking decisions of banks. My 
overall analysis consisted of a time-series analysis looking at the trends of these 
variables from 1997 to 2011. This gave a good picture as to the risk banks were 
taking before and after the repeal in order to better see the effects this policy had.  
The results of my study were mixed due to the complex nature of these 
variables and how they are reported but I was still able to conclude that the repeal 
did increase the risk U.S. banks were taking in the years leading up to the Great 
Recession. Although many other factors could have played an important part in 
why risk was increased during this time period, the results of my study show that 
GLBA did play a part in this. I would not say that the results of my study should 
lead to blame of the recession being placed solely on the repeal of Glass-Steagall 
but I think it is significant in adding to the debate on the role regulation plays in 
financial crises and how it affects the financial system as a whole.  
I think my study is significant because it shows the effect deregulation, 
such as the repeal of Glass-Steagall, on our financial system and the crises it can 
precipitate. However, I also argue in my concluding remarks that proper 
regulation or deregulation is still a heavily debated topic and is one that is 
constantly changing with the fast moving financial system. It is important for 
regulators in the future to consider recent changes in the financial system, as 
opposed to the past, when deciding on future regulations. Without properly 
considering the ways in which the market has shifted and how new policies could 
react to this will make future regulation ineffective and bring about more crises, 
possibly worse than the one our world just went through. This study has provided 
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another important opinion on this topic and provides some substantial evidence to 
back this claim.  
 
 
